C § E § A § L |
Center for the Economic Analysis of Law |
WASHINGTON, DC |
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Assessing
the Economic Cost of Deficiencies in the Framework for Secured Transactions: Examinations of Argentina and Bolivia |
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Heywood W. Fleisig October 1995 September 1996,r |
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The
views and interpretations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the views and policies of the World Bank or of its
Executive Directors or the countries they represent, or of the Center for the
Economic Analysis of Law.
This
paper was written by Heywood Fleisig, Director of Research at the Center for
Economic Analysis of Law. It is part of a larger project on the framework of
secured transactions being undertaken under the broad supervision of Vicente
Fretes-Cibils (LA3C1), Jonathan Parker (LA3NR), and Steven N. Schonberger
(LA1NR). The author thanks Nuria de la Peña, Lance Girton, Ken Kletzer, Stephen
Salant, and the participants in a seminar organized by L. Alan Winters for
their extensive and helpful comments.
Any errors, however, entirely remain the responsibility of the author.
©
1996 by Heywood W. Fleisig
All
Rights Reserved
Printed
in the United States of America
1. Deficiencies
in the framework for secured transactions lead to higher interest rates for
loans on movable property. These higher
interest rates make it less profitable for producers to hold capital;
therefore, they produce less. How much
less? This annex examines that
question. It shows, under plausible
assumptions, that Argentina could lose between 4% and 8% of GDP as a result of
these defects, amounting to about $12 billion to $24 billion. Using different techniques, it estimates a
similar percentage loss for Bolivia -- between 3 percent and 9 percent of
Bolivian GDP -- amounting to $230 million to $690 million annually. By
contrast, the comprehensive legal and regulatory changes that are needed could
be studied and implemented for well under $1 million and a complete overhaul of
the registries would cost under $10 million.
2. While
these are only rough estimates, the benefits potentially outweigh the gains by
so much and the gains are so large that they support the importance of placing
the solution to this problem high on the policy agenda for government.
3. This
paper first shows how the interest rate determines the total amount of capital
in use. Then it discusses how
differences in the quality of collateral will lead lenders to charge higher
interest rates for movable property and reduce the amount of such property in
use. Examining the problem from the
perspective of the demand for capital, it then uses some conventional
properties of production functions to estimate the impact on Argentina of the
higher interest rates of movable property. In the case of Bolivia, the paper
examines the problem from the perspective of the sources of funds and the
structure of debt. It compares lending
for movable property in Bolivia with lending for movable property in the United
States, where movable property is considerably better collateral.
4. The use of both Bolivia and Argentina as
comparators is important. Despite their
wide economic differences, and the substantially greater investment in human
capital in Argentina, the two counties have nearly identical legal regimes for
lending against movable property.
Bolivia adopted the Argentine framework in 1952. The finding of similar problems and costs
despite the other economic differences makes more robust the overall estimate
of the economic cost of defects in the framework for secured transactions.